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The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) is
a significant regional treaty under which eight protocols have been developed. The Con-
vention offers a case study on the legal and political challenges that can occur when
addressing air pollution. This article explores the recent history of the CLRTAP regime,
drawing on the conceptual lens of regime effectiveness. First, the article considers how
the legal framework has been modernized over the past decade to reflect changes in
the sources and effects of air pollution. This has predominantly occurred through
amendments to the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-
Level Ozone, the 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 1998 Protocol
on Heavy Metals, which were negotiated in 2009–2012. The amendments are an
important point in the regime’s history, as they set more stringent pollution limits. Partic-
ular attention is paid to their prospective entry into force and their broader impact on
European law. Second, the geographic coverage of the legal instruments has long been
an issue of concern, with a number of former Soviet Union States choosing to not par-
ticipate in the pollution-specific protocols. The article reviews efforts to boost participa-
tion through the creation in 2011 of a coordinating group to promote action in the
countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Third, the article explores
recent developments in compliance and inventory adjustments under the Gothenburg
Protocol, as a demonstration of how the system approaches changes in scientific knowl-
edge on the sources and levels of air pollution, and how this affects compliance.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(CLRTAP)1 is fast approaching its 40th anniversary since its signing
and has been in force for just under 35 years. The Convention was
negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE), an organization that was set up to aid
the reconstruction and redevelopment of Europe after the Second
World War.2 In practical terms, the UNECE attempts to tie together a
heterogeneous range of geopolitical groupings: North America, West-
ern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and parts of West and Cen-
tral Asia. The Convention therefore has the potential to extend
transboundary air pollution law over a geographic range of 47 million
square kilometres, encompassing 20 percent of the world population.3
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1Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (adopted 13 November 1979,
entered into force 16 March 1983) 1302 UNTS 217 (CLRTAP).
2The UNECE was created and given its terms of reference by UN Economic and Social
Council, Economic Commission for Europe (UNESCO Res 36 (IV) (28 March 1947), docu-
ment E/402); for a history of the UNECE, see Y Berthelot and P Rayment, Looking Back and
Peering Forward: A Short History of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
1947–2007 (UN 2007); see also AS Bishop and RD Munro, ‘The UN Regional Commissions
and Environmental Problems’ (1972) 26 International Organization 348.
3UNECE ‘Geographical Scope’ <https://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/region.html>.
DOI: 10.1111/reel.12219
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The CLRTAP mainly came into existence as a response to the phe-
nomenon of acid deposition (acid rain). Over time, the range of pollu-
tants and environmental phenomena that the law addresses has
expanded through seven protocols to include the regulation of sulphur
oxides (SOx) (particularly sulphur dioxide or SO2),
4 nitrogen oxides (NOx)
(particularly nitrogen dioxide or NO2),
5 non-methane volatile organic
compounds (NMVOCs),6 ammonia (NH3),
7 fine particulate matter
(PM2.5),
8 heavy metals (lead, cadmium, mercury)9 and persistent organic
pollutants (POPs).10 The European Monitoring and Evaluation Pro-
gramme (EMEP) aids the Convention process through the monitoring,
measuring and modelling of air pollution and receives funding through
the 1984 EMEP Protocol.11 Speaking purely in terms of codification,
the developments under the Convention point to it being one of the
most successful examples of a multilateral environmental agreement
(MEA) that has ever existed. Although the regime has played a major
role in efforts to reduce acidification, photochemical smog, ground-level
ozone, eutrophication and toxic pollution, significant challenges remain.
In a previous publication I analysed and explored the history of
the CLRTAP in detail through the analytical framework of regime
design and effectiveness.12 Based on current thinking in international
law and politics, effectiveness can be divided into three strands –
legal effectiveness,13 institutional design14 and normative effective-
ness.15 In total, criteria of 12 effectiveness sub-headings were used.
In this shorter article, I focus on recent developments under the
regime (focusing on the past 10 years), and return to three areas of
concern – entry into force, State participation and compliance.
1.1 | Entry into force
A central argument was that for an environmental treaty to be le-
gally effective, there would need to be high levels of compliance
with ambitious and precise commitments, although a close reading
of the history of the regime suggested that soft law and institutional
innovations can bolster participation and improve environmental
effectiveness over the long term.16 Between 2009 and 2012, the
parties negotiated amendments to the 1998 POPs Protocol,17 the
1998 Heavy Metals Protocol18 and the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol.19
These amendments attempted to improve the legal framework and
reflect changes in the sources and effects of air pollution, potentially
improving the air quality of the UNECE region. The analytical frame-
work of legal effectiveness does not, however, adequately address
issues of entry into force. The amendments and their entry into
force must therefore be given prominence in any effectiveness
assessment as their legal status reflects momentum, legitimacy and
State support for multilateral action on transboundary air pollution;
this also enables formal assessments of compliance.
1.2 | State participation
The geographic coverage of the legal instruments has long been an
issue of concern, with a number of the former Soviet Union States
choosing to not participate in the pollution-specific protocols
adopted after the end of the Cold War. I have previously argued
that ‘state participation is a key area where the regime needs to
make substantial improvements’.20 I return to this subject and
4Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transbound-
ary Fluxes by at Least 30 per cent (adopted 8 July 1985, entered into force 2 September
1987) 1480 UNTS 215 (Sulphur Protocol I); Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP on Further
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (adopted 14 June 1994, entered into force 5 August 1998)
2030 UNTS 122 (Sulphur Protocol II); Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP to Abate Acidification,
Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone (adopted 30 November 1999, entered into force
17 May 2005) 2319 UNTS 81 (Gothenburg Protocol). See RR Churchill, G Kutting and LM
Warren, ‘The 1994 UN ECE Sulphur Protocol’ (1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 169;
J Wettestad, ‘The 1999 Multi-pollutant Protocol: A Neglected Break-through in Solving Eur-
ope’s Air Pollution Problems?’ in OS Stokke and ØB Thommessen (eds), Yearbook of Interna-
tional Co-operation on Environment and Development (Earthscan 2002) 35.
5Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or
their Transboundary Fluxes (adopted 31 October 1988, entered into force 14 February
1991) 1593 UNTS 287 (NOx Protocol); Gothenburg Protocol (n 4) Annex II.
6Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic
Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes (adopted 18 November 1991, entered into force
29 September 1997) 2001 UNTS 187 (VOCs Protocol); Gothenburg Protocol (n 4) Annex II.
7Gothenburg Protocol (n 4) Annex II.
8Included in UNECE ‘Decision 2012/2 on Amendment of the Text of and Annexes II to IX
to the Protocol and the Addition of New Annexes X and XI’ (adopted 4 May 2012, not yet
in force) UN Doc ECE/EB.AIR/111/Add.1 (2012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments).
9Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP on Heavy Metals (adopted 24 June 1998, entered into force
29 December 2003) 2237 UNTS 4 (Heavy Metals Protocol).
10Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP on Persistent Organic Pollutants (adopted 24 June 1998,
entered into force 23 October 2003) 2230 UNTS 79 (POPs Protocol). See K Hillman, ‘Inter-
national Control of Persistent Organic Pollutants: The UN Economic Commission for Europe
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and Beyond’ (1999) 8 Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law 105.
11Protocol to the 1979 CLRTAP on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme
for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe
(EMEP) (adopted 28 September 1984, entered into force 28 January 1988) 1491 UNTS
167 (EMEP Protocol).
12A Byrne, ‘The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Assessing its
Effectiveness as a Multilateral Environmental Regime after 35 Years’ (2015) 4 Transnational
Environmental Law 37. The theoretical underpinnings of regime effectiveness are detailed
more fully in that longer article, but draw upon D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of Interna-
tional Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2011) 262–271; and PH Sand (ed), The
Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments
(Grotius 1992) 4–7. I apply the term regime following the political scientist and international
relations theorist EB Haas, who used the term to capture the ‘norms, rules, and procedures
agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area’; EB Haas, ‘Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage
and International Regimes Source’ (1980) 32 World Politics 357, 358.
13Subdivided into (i) the commitments and compliance; (ii) the use of binding/non-binding
instruments; (iii) the precision of the rules; and (iv) the implementation strategies.
14Focusing on (i) the core institutions; and (ii) the international implementation procedures,
which included dispute settlement and reporting, review and non-compliance procedures.
15Subdivided into (i) legitimacy and the rules on decision making and participation; (ii) State
participation; (iii) the assignment of implementation responsibilities; (iv) the degree of bur-
den sharing and financial assistance; and (v) the empowerment of domestic stakeholders.
16Byrne (n 12) 44.
17UNECE ‘Decision 2009/1 on Amending the Text of and Annexes I, II, III, IV, VI and VIII to
the POPs Protocol’; ‘Decision 2009/2 on Listing of Short-Chain Chlorinated Paraffins and
Polychlorinated Naphthalenes in Annexes I and II to the POPs Protocol’; ‘Decision 2009/3
on Amending Annexes V and VII to the POPs Protocol’; ‘Decision 2009/4 on the Guidance
Document on Best Available Techniques to Control Emissions to the POPs Protocol’ UN
Doc ECE/EB.AIR/99/Add.1 (18 December 2009) (2009 POPs Protocol Amendments).
18UNECE ‘Decision 2012/5 on Amendment of the Text of and Annexes other than III and
VII to the 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals’; ‘Decision 2012/6 on Amendment of Annex III
to the 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals’ UN Doc ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1 (13 December
2012) (2012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments).
19UNECE ‘Decision 2012/1 on Amendment of Annex I to the Protocol’ (adopted 4 May 2012,
entered into force 5 June 2013) UN Doc ECE/EB.AIR/111/Add.1; Decision 2012/2 (n 8).
20Byrne (n 12) 60.
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consider the efforts to boost participation through the creation in
2011 of a coordinating group to promote action in the countries of
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA). Having now
existed for six years, enough time has passed to make some tenta-
tive conclusions as to whether this approach has improved participa-
tion.
1.3 | Compliance
This article explores the recent history of compliance and inventory
adjustments under the Gothenburg Protocol, as a demonstration of
how the system approaches changes in scientific knowledge on the
sources and levels of air pollution. I suggest that an assessment of
compliance should be read more broadly than simply the achieve-
ment of the objectives as approved by expert assessments and/or
implementation committees, but rather should include some discus-
sion of the manner in which States reached compliance, and whether
this is in keeping with the spirit of the law and broader environmen-
tal principles.21
2 | A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
It was within a context of great reluctance to acknowledge the prob-
lem of acid rain that the CLRTAP was negotiated.22 The Convention
was consequently a ‘loose’ framework agreement23 or a proto-
framework agreement with an aspirational tone. Article 1(b) defined
long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) as:
air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or
in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of
one State and which has adverse effects in the area
under the jurisdiction of another State at such a dis-
tance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the
contribution of individual emission sources or groups of
sources.24
This definition captures a broad range of pollutants and scales,
from potentially a single source positioned along a national border,
to a number of sources in an industrial zone, to diffuse pollution
(e.g., vehicle emissions). It does not set an upper limit on the geo-
graphical scope of what can be considered transboundary. It also
appears to suggest that the sources of transboundary air pollution
cannot be identified, but it was possible to identify the general
sources by the late 1970s, if not the specific point sources.25 Where
there were a number of national borders converging the difficulties
increased however (e.g., the Benelux region). This creatively ambigu-
ous definition was bound up in the realpolitik that action on trans-
boundary air pollution would avoid discussion of liability,26 with a
general acceptance by the negotiating parties that a focus on collect-
ive action would be more conducive to multilateral action. Article 2
of the Convention created the general obligation on the contracting
parties to ‘endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce
and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air pol-
lution’.27 The other major achievements of the Convention included
provisions on notification, consultation, monitoring and an embryonic
version of the requirement to use best available technology which
was qualified by economic feasibility.28
Although it is very difficult to directly ascribe cause and effect to
an MEA, and perhaps not appropriate given that the amelioration of
environmental problems relies on a range of interconnected and
interdependent social, political, technological, economic and cultural
factors, as well as legal ones,29 it is reasonable to conclude that the
Convention process played its part in producing significant declines in
air pollution.30 The most remarkable achievement to date has been
the decline in SO2 emissions: European emissions stabilized in the
1980s and then dropped from 60 million tonnes/year (t/y) in 1990 to
20 million t/y in 2000, with current levels at ~13 million t/y.31
21EB Weiss, ‘Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The
Baker’s Dozen Myths’ (1999) 32 University of Richmond Law Review 1555, 1563.
22The UK, West Germany and later the Reagan administration in the United States were
particularly indifferent. J McCormick, Acid Earth: The Global Threat of Acid Pollution (Earth-
scan 1990) 76.
23Wettestad (n 4) 35.
24CLRTAP (n 1) art 1(b).
25See, e.g., H Rodhe, ‘A Study of the Sulfur Budget for the Atmosphere over Northern Eur-
ope’ (1972) 24 Tellus 128; B Bolin and C Persson, ‘Regional Dispersion and Deposition of
Atmospheric Pollutants with Particular Application to Sulfur Pollution over Western Europe’
(1975) 27 Tellus 281; JN Galloway and DM Whelpdale, ‘An Atmospheric Sulfur Budget for
Eastern North America’ (1980) 14 Atmospheric Environment 409; G Handl, ‘National Uses
of Transboundary Air Resources: The International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered’ (1986)
26 Natural Resources Journal 405; see also United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), Air Pollution: Promoting Regional Cooperation (UNEP 2010) 42–44.
26The Article 8(f) footnote, inserted at the request of the UK, stated that the ‘present Con-
vention does not contain a rule on State liability as to damage’. See M Pallemaerts, ‘Interna-
tional Legal Aspects of Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’ (1988) 1 Hague Yearbook
of International Law 189; and JG Lammers, ‘The European Approach to Acid Rain’ in DB
Magraw (ed), International Law and Pollution (University of Pennsylvania Press 1991) 265.
27CLRTAP (n 1) art 2.
28A Rosencranz, ‘The ECE Convention of 1979 on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’
(1981) 75 American Journal of International Law 975, 977.
29The energy transitions literature has highlighted the complex and contingent nature of
large-scale change; see generally FW Geels et al, ‘The Enactment of Socio-technical Transi-
tion Pathways: A Reformulated Typology and a Comparative Multi-level Analysis of the
German and UK Low-Carbon Electricity Transitions (1990–2014)’ (2016) 45 Research Policy
896, 897. For the influence of the regime in spurring technological change, see T Dekker,
HRJ Vollebergh, F de Vries and CA Withagen, ‘Inciting Protocols’ (2012) 64 Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 45; HRJ Vollebergh and E van der Werf, ‘The
Role of Standards in Eco-innovation: Lessons for Policymakers’ (2014) 8 Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy 230.
30For the history of the regime, see Byrne (n 12); S Marsden and E Brandon, Transboundary
Environmental Governance in Asia Practice and Prospects with the UNECE Agreements: Practice
and Prospects with the UNECE Agreements (Edward Elgar 2015) 201–237; HC Bugge, ‘The
Principle and Duty to Cooperate: The Case of Conventions on Transboundary Air Pollution in
Europe’ in S Jayakumar, T Koh and HD Phan (eds), Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of
International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2015) 263; and J Wettestad, ‘The Improving
Effectiveness of CLRTAP: Due to Clever Design?’ in R Lidskog and G Sundqvist (eds), Govern-
ing the Air: The Dynamics of Science, Policy, and Citizen Interaction (MIT Press 2011) 39.
31D Fowler et al, ‘Acidification of Lakes and Forest Soils’ in R Maas and P Grennfelt (eds),
Towards Cleaner Air: Scientific Assessment Report 2016 (EMEP Steering Body and Working
Group on Effects of the CLRTAP 2016) 7, 7.
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Nitrogen dioxide emissions have also declined markedly, although per-
haps less spectacularly, reducing from ~29 million t/y in 1990 to ~17
million t/y presently.32 Emissions of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs), heavy metal pollution and POPs have also declined, and there
is also growing evidence that implementing the CLRTAP protocols
may have contributed to modest reductions in carbon dioxide.33
The UNECE was an extremely useful institutional home for tack-
ling certain types of transboundary air pollution, such as acid rain,
which fitted, or could be made to fit, into its boundaries. Choosing to
adhere to these membership criteria was diplomatically shrewd given
its East–West membership, and politically convenient given the limited
interest in tackling the problem on a global scale at the time.34 The
CLRTAP reflects how the problem was being approached, by scientists
and politicians, as a regional problem rather than a global one.35 The
membership criteria have become a limitation in recent years, however,
as the hemispheric nature of POPs, mercury, ozone and particulate
matter mean that the CLRTAP protocols which address these pollutants
can only ever be partially successful, and points towards the need for
global approaches to air pollution.36 Discussions on whether the
CLRTAP could be opened up to non-UNECE States were unsuccessful
in the mid-2000s.37 The Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum (GAP
Forum, active between 2005 and 2012), based at the Stockholm Environ-
ment Institute, commented in 2010 that there was ‘no realistic prospect
of achieving [a more effective inter-regional and global framework]
through negotiation of a new global air pollution treaty, nor by widening
the scope of existing conventions’.38 Regardless of the potential benefits
and the desirability of a global approach, there is little prospect in the
short term for a global treaty.39 Regional approaches to air pollution are
likely to remain important and dominant over the coming decade.
From the 1990s onwards, the policy focus broadened out from
ecosystem protection to include human health co-benefits (e.g., par-
ticulate matter) and the range of sectors that received attention also
expanded (e.g., agriculture). A major achievement for the regime was
the adoption of amendments to the late 1990s protocols. These
were of key importance because they extended the framework to
2020 and beyond, increased the stringency of the commitments and
incorporated more chemicals. The original 1998 POPs Protocol
banned eight POPs (e.g., toxaphene), whilst four were scheduled for
elimination and four had severe restrictions placed on them (includ-
ing DDT40 and PCBs41). A deadline was created for the introduction
of incineration emission limit values, whilst the Protocol also set
rules for the disposal of the banned substances. The 2009 POPs
Protocol Amendments42 put in place further restrictions and regulate
additional POPs, targeting solvents, brominated fire retardants, pesti-
cides and industrial chemicals. The amendments also provide new
emission limit values for waste incineration and provide best avail-
able technique (BAT) guidance to control emissions.
The original 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol set reductions on cad-
mium, lead and mercury emissions and set emission limit values and
BAT for new and existing major stationary sources. The 2012 Heavy
Metals Protocol Amendments43 created stricter emission limit values
and also included more emissions sources. The original 1999
Gothenburg Protocol required parties to control and reduce emis-
sions of sulphur, NOx, VOCs and NH3, with the 2010 emission ceil-
ings/targets based on critical loads.44 The Protocol also established
32ibid.
33A Slechten and V Verardi, ‘Measuring the Impact of Multiple Air Pollution Agreements on
Global CO2 Emissions’ (2016) 92 Land Economics 534. There are potential economic, environ-
mental and health co-benefits between air pollution reduction and climate change mitigation,
which suggests that an international law approach to air pollution would be useful. R Swart, M
Amman, F Raes and W Tuinstra, ‘A Good Climate for Clean Air: Linkages between Climate
Change and Air Pollution: An Editorial Essay’ (2004) 66 Climatic Change 263; P Tollefsen et al,
‘Air Pollution Policies in Europe: Efficiency Gains from Integrating Climate Effects with Damage
Costs to Health and Crops’ (2009) 12 Environmental Science and Policy 870; GF Nemet, T
Holloway and P Meier, ‘Implications of Incorporating Air-Quality Co-benefits into Climate
Change Policymaking’ (2010) 5 Environmental Research Letters 4535. Reflecting the import-
ance of climate change, the UNECE became a partner in the Climate and Clean Air Coalition
to reduce short lived climate pollutants; see <http://www.ccacoalition.org>.
34For a critical analysis on the importance of science in diplomacy and the Convention, see
R Rothschild, ‘Detente from the Air: Monitoring Air Pollution during the Cold War’ (2016)
57 Technology and Culture 831.
35See, e.g., GE Likens and FH Bormann, ‘Acid Rain: A Serious Regional Environmental Prob-
lem’ (1974) 184 Science 1176.
36The impacts of POPs have disproportionately fallen on the polar environment given the
phenomenon of global distillation which leads them to concentrate in the higher latitudes.
See F Wania and D Mackay, ‘Tracking the Distribution of Persistent Organic Pollutants’
(1996) 30 Environmental Science and Technology 390. It was suggested in the early 2000s
that the CLRTAP was a model for a potential hemispheric air pollution treaty which could
tackle intercontinental transport of air pollution, although it was argued that regional
approaches would be more politically palatable. T Holloway, A Fiore and MG Hastings, ‘Inter-
continental Transport of Air Pollution: Will Emerging Science Lead to a New Hemispheric
Treaty?’ (2003) 37 Environmental Science and Technology 4535; H Selin, ‘Comment on
“Intercontinental Transport of Air Pollution: Will Emerging Science Lead to a New Hemi-
spheric Treaty?”’ (2004) 38 Environmental Science and Technology 1912. In Asia, pollution
was already high in 1979, accounting for around 10 percent of global sulphur emissions, and
the continent overtook Western European emissions in the 1980s. China and India now
account for ~40 percent of global SO2 emissions (~30 and 10 percent, respectively). DI Stern,
‘Global Sulfur Emissions from 1850 to 2000’ (2005) 58 Chemosphere 163, 169; Z Klimont, SJ
Smith and J Cofala, ‘The Last Decade of Global Anthropogenic Sulfur Dioxide: 2000–2011
Emissions’ (2013) 8 Environmental Research Letters 014003. Pollution from Asia crosses
regional borders, and there is increasing evidence that it has hemispheric impacts. PM2.5 pol-
lution produced in China in 2007 has been linked to 64,800 external premature deaths,
including more than 3,100 in Western Europe and the United States, whilst internally Chinese
PM2.5 pollution has been linked to 108,600 premature deaths. V Ramanathan and Y Feng,
‘Air Pollution, Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change: Global and Regional Perspectives’
(2009) 43 Atmospheric Environment 37; SK Guttikunda and P Jawahar, ‘Atmospheric Emis-
sions and Pollution from the Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plants in India’ (2014) 92 Atmos-
pheric Environment 449; Q Zhang et al, ‘Transboundary Health Impacts of Transported
Global Air Pollution and International Trade’ (2017) 543 Nature 705.
37UNECE ‘Possibilities for Opening the Convention: Note by the Bureau in Consultation
with the Secretariat’ UN Doc ECE/EB.AIR/2006/8 (29 September 2006).
38Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), ‘Atmospheric Pollution: Developing a Global
Approach’ (SEI 2010). Rather than reordering air pollution law by adopting a general frame-
work, States have preferred to tackle pollutants dependent on their particular characteris-
tics, following the CLRTAP precedent of pollutant-specific instruments, and there have
been sustained efforts to develop international law with the Stockholm Convention on Per-
sistent Organic Pollutants (adopted 22 May 2001, entered into force 17 May 2004) 2256
UNTS 119; and Minamata Convention on Mercury (adopted 10 October 2013, entered into
force 16 August 2017) (2016) 55 ILM 582.
39See PH Sand and JB Wiener, ‘Towards a New International Law of the Atmosphere’
(2016) 7 Goettingen Journal of International Law 195, 212; see also PH Sand, ‘The Dis-
course on “Protection of the Atmosphere” in the International Law Commission’ (2017) 26
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 201.
40Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane.
41Polychlorinated biphenyls.
422009 POPs Protocol Amendments (n 17).
432012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments (n 18).
44Gothenburg Protocol (n 4). For the rationale, see P Grennfeit, Ø Hov and D Derwent,
‘Second Generation Abatement Strategies for NOx, NH₃, SO₂, and VOCs’ (1994) 23 Ambio
425.
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emission limits for a range of sources, along with the BAT require-
ment. The 2012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments45 set new 2020
emissions ceilings for existing pollutants as well as for PM2.5. Euro-
pean Union (EU) Member States are jointly required to reduce SO2
emissions by 59 percent, NOx emissions by 42 percent, VOCs by 28
percent, NH3 by 6 percent and particulate matter by 22 percent.
46
A further development of note was the introduction of ‘flexible
transitional arrangements’ in the 2012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amend-
ments47 and the 2012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments,48 which
were to appeal to new parties to the protocols. The amended Gothen-
burg Protocol49 affords new parties an extension for the development
of implementation plans with a final implementation deadline of 31
December 2030. The 2012 amendments to the Heavy Metals Protocol
contained similar extensions for the implementation of BAT and limit
values to existing stationary sources. The deadline for new parties to
take advantage of these arrangements is by the end of December 2019.
3 | ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
AMENDMENTS
The entry into force of the amendments will signpost State commit-
ment to tackling transboundary air pollution, strengthen the regime’s
legitimacy and credibility,50 and will enable formal assessments of
compliance. What then is the current situation regarding the entry
into force of the amendments? For certain non-binding elements,
the parties agreed that they could enter into force via decisions of
the Executive Body (EB); the remainder would require the parties to
formally accept them. The amendments to Annexes V and VII of the
1998 POPs Protocol which provide guidance on BAT entered into
force in 2010.51 The amendments to Annex I of the 1999 Gothen-
burg Protocol are in force and adjusted the level of critical loads.52
Amendments to Annex III of the 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol on
guidance for BAT have also entered into force.53
The outlook for the amendments which require the parties to
formally accept them (e.g., the emissions targets) is somewhat
disconcerting, but there are grounds for optimism. The threshold for
entry into force is that two-thirds of the parties at the time of their
adoption formally accept them.54 It appears that the 2009 amend-
ments to the text and to Annexes I–IV, VI and VIII to the 1998 POPs
Protocol might enter into force first, as eight years since the EB
adopted the amendments by consensus it has 13 parties, including
the EU and Canada. A total of 19 acceptances will be required.55
This seems likely to occur if the majority of EU Member States
accept. The 2009 Amendments to Annexes I and II to the 1998
POPs Protocol has currently 10 acceptances, including the EU. Like-
wise, it will require 19 for entry into force.
The 2012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments56 have been
accepted by 11 parties including the United States and the EU, and
require 22 acceptances to enter into force.57 Perhaps surprising
given its prominent position and flagship status is the acceptance
rate for the 2012 Amendment of the text and Annexes II–IX, and
the addition of new Annexes X and XI to the Gothenburg Protocol.
Currently only six parties have accepted, although the recent accep-
tance of the United States and the EU may give some momentum
and aid its entry into force. These amendments require 17 parties to
accept.58
A crucial role is played by the EU in bolstering action on LRTAP
through the incorporation of these amendments into EU law.59 The
EU amended its regulation on POPs in 2010,60 and the bloc has also
completed the process for the acceptance of the 2012 Gothenburg
Amendments,61 now that it has agreed the 2016 National Emission
Ceilings (NEC) Directive.62 The 2020–2029 commitments in the new
452012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments (n 8 and n 19).
46C Agren, ‘New Gothenburg Protocol Adopted’ (Acid News, June 2012) <http://www.airc
lim.org/acidnews/new-gothenburg-protocol-adopted>.
472012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments (n 18).
482012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments (n 8).
49Gothenburg Protocol (n 4).
50See D Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
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Directive are the same as the Gothenburg Protocol Amendments,63
seen at the time as not particularly ambitious,64 although the Direct-
ive set more stringent 2030 targets. The 2016 NEC Directive is an
important development as it means that the 2012 Gothenburg
Protocol Amendments65 will apply to the EU Member States even if
they do not enter into force.
Whereas the early period of the regime was largely driven by
the leadership of the Nordic States,66 replaced by the EU in the
1990s and 2000s,67 it is now becoming an increasingly difficult
task to identify leadership in Europe for enhanced action on trans-
boundary air pollution since the great recession, with most momen-
tum currently emanating from city mayors who are better
positioned to respond to local concerns, but are not formally
involved in national or European decision making.68 Traditional eco-
nomic arguments have been in the ascendency over the recent
period and explain why States have not accepted the amendments
in sufficient numbers, with concerns over cost-effectiveness, aus-
terity and the effects of environmental regulations on the economy
being dominant. The 2016 NEC Directive, for example, struggled
with the problem of enforcing emission limit values for vehicles
and also experienced a strong lobby from industry, agriculture69
and some governments (e.g., the United Kingdom (UK)), that led to
the European Commission’s proposals being watered down.70
The EB has maintained focus on the amendments and from indi-
cations from the parties, it appears that the amendments for the
POPs Protocol and the amended Heavy Metals Protocol may enter
into force by 2018, and the amended Gothenburg Protocol by
2019.71 This is predicated on the parties following through on their
words. If the amendments do not enter into force, it would raise
serious questions as to the commitment of the UNECE States to
cooperate on transboundary air pollution and would represent some-
thing of a setback for the regime, which risks the law becoming fixed
in the 1990s.
4 | IMPROVING STATE PARTICIPATION IN
THE REGIME
An effectiveness assessment of international environmental law stres-
ses that getting the relevant States to participate is a key marker for
success.72 However, the term ‘relevant State’ is open to interpretation
for transboundary air pollution law. Relevance is determined by
science and the specific domestic and geopolitical context. In its early
history, the CLRTAP regime focused on the key polluting States of
Northern Europe, and due to industrial secrecy and meteorology, the
European border of the former Soviet Union became one of the main
areas of attention, as opposed to the Soviet Union as a whole.73 With
the optimism of the end of the Cold War, the principle of regional
unity and increasing standardization across the UNECE region came
to the fore. With the breaking up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
in the early 1990s, a great deal of effort was put into getting the
newly independent States (NIS) to accede to the Convention. This was
largely successful, by 2006 out of potentially 56 member States to the
UNECE, the Convention had 51 parties, with only Andorra, Israel, San
Marino, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan not becoming parties
to the CLRTAP. Furthermore, the NIS of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus
and Central Asia, particularly those who did not become members of
the EU, or were heavily industrialized prior to gaining membership,
such as Poland, did not become parties to the protocols adopted after
the end of the Cold War. The next step has been to increase the
accessions to the protocols so that the legal framework would apply
more fully to the entire UNECE region, and not just predominantly to
Western Europe and North America. What were considered the ‘rele-
vant States’ changed due to geopolitics and changes in scientific
knowledge, but it remains the case that there is limited motivation for
supporting EECCA States in their pollution reduction activities, and no
formal funding mechanism exists in the protocols, despite the issue
being known for at least 25 years.74 The Regional Air Pollution Infor-
mation and Simulation model developed by the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis, which provides estimates of the envi-
ronmental and economic effectiveness of the abatement strategies to
inform the negotiations, had found that large emission reductions in
Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland) were the most effective. As Reis and col-
leagues have suggested, however, ‘low average incomes in Eastern
European countries could prohibit ambitious policy measures’.75
There are a number of caveats when trying to implement environ-
mental law in the NIS, especially in the Central Asian States. As Mars-
den has noted, the region has ‘a prevailing culture of secrecy,
corruption and political authoritarianism, under which opposition to
632012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments (n 8).
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Albin, ‘Rethinking Justice and Fairness: The Case of Acid Rain Emission Reductions’ (1995)
21 Review of International Studies 119.
BYRNE | 215
the various regimes has often been brutally suppressed’.76 The UNECE
does have experience with working in such circumstances, having
been able to successfully engage with the Soviet Union in the late
1970s and 1980s, however. The creation of the Russian-led EECCA
Coordinating Group was a significant step forward, and it held its first
meeting in 2011.77 This work was also complemented by meetings
and workshops jointly held with the CLRTAP Task Force on Techno-
Economic Issues.78 In terms of accession to the CLRTAP, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan made optimistic noises in the early
2010s,79 but are yet to become parties. There were signals that the
other EECCA countries might accede to the protocols, for example, in
2010 Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation signed a
Memorandum ‘On Development of Eastern Dimension of the Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’.80
How has the UNECE fared in its ambition to get more parties to
the protocols? The 1984 EMEP Protocol81 appears to have been the
biggest beneficiary of this drive, and suggests that the EECCA coun-
tries view the monitoring of air pollution as requiring international
cooperation. An optimistic interpretation could be captured by the
maxim ‘monitoring first, emissions reductions later’. Since 2011, the
EMEP Protocol has gained four parties, taking the total to 47: Alba-
nia (2011), Armenia (2014), Georgia (2013) and Moldova (2016). This
means that Eastern Europe is now included in the funding regime on
a voluntary basis, and further work with Azerbaijan and the States
of Central Asia would take this Protocol to the ratification levels of
the Convention.
The trends in ratification and the geographic scope of the most
recent protocols (the late 1990s protocols) suggest that the attempts
by the UNECE to get further ratifications have not been a great suc-
cess. Poland became a party to the NOx Protocol in 2011, whilst
Macedonia became a party to both the Sulphur Protocol II and the
Gothenburg Protocol in 2014. Montenegro, Serbia and Spain became
parties to both the Heavy Metals Protocol and the POPs Protocol in
this period, whilst Portugal became a party to the Heavy Metals Proto-
col in 2017. Generally speaking, Northern Europe is at the centre of
the regime and there is also a corridor of parties in Central and South-
eastern Europe from the German border to Bulgaria who are parties to
the late 1990s protocols. The EU accession process for the Eastern
European countries is likely a contributing factor.82
A major problem remains with the industrial, coal-dependent and
oil-producing regions of the former Soviet Union. Poland could not be
swayed into ratifying the late 1990s protocols despite EU accession,
whilst Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, the Southern Caucasus and the Central
Asian States also remain indifferent. There was some optimism that the
EECCA Coordinating Group might make progress, with Belarus, Kaz-
akhstan, Moldova and Russia signalling their intention to become parties
to the later protocols.83 As yet, these accessions have not materialized.
Turkey and Israel should be mentioned, as they are part of the
UNECE area. Turkey, a founding member of the UNECE, ratified the
Convention in 1983 and became a party to the EMEP Protocol in 1985
but has not participated since. Israel joined the UNECE in 1991 and
has been active in other UNECE areas, most recently acceding to the
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Conven-
tion on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) in
2013.84 It has not ratified the CLRTAP and consequently does not par-
ticipate in any of the protocols. It is not clear why a number of Eastern
Mediterranean countries do not participate; it may be that because the
region is not completely represented by the UNECE boundary,85 States
have a disincentive to take on the commitments, or it may be that Tur-
key’s indifference to LRTAP has therefore diminished political will in
the surrounding region.86 Cyprus is somewhat of an outlier, having rat-
ified the later protocols, but the absence of Greece, Israel, Malta and
Turkey leaves most of the region outside the scope of the late 1990s
protocols.
The recent history of the developments under the CLRTAP sug-
gest that the past 10 years have been something of an impasse with
regards to State participation. The lack of substantial financial incen-
tives for the EECCA countries may be a contributing factor, but it is
unlikely that in the future mechanisms will be established beyond the
development support already offered by Western parties.87 It is
entirely possible that in the short to medium term (for the next 20
years) the Eastern UNECE region will remain outside the scope of the
protocols. The UNECE and the EB of the CLRTAP need to reconsider
how they interact with the EECCA States if any progress is to be
made, in particular by creating a more dynamic approach that enables
front runners in the EECCA to emerge. This may increase the applica-
tion of transboundary air pollution law across the entire bloc.
5 | ADJUSTMENTS UNDER THE 1999
GOTHENBURG PROTOCOL
Compliance and implementation are of central importance to the
notion of legal effectiveness, as are the precision and stringency of
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Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia’, Informal Doc No 21 (11–15 April 2011).
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the commitments.88 The manner of compliance tends to be over-
looked in effectiveness assessments, however. The issue that I
address here is how expert-led technical changes have a significant
effect on whether a State is considered to be in compliance. That
compliance is co-produced by law and science is not in dispute,89
but how we interpret and assess such occurrences within the effect-
iveness framework remains controversial.
A vivid example of the important role of expertise in the regime is
the principle of adjustments to national emissions levels and ceilings,
which became part of the legal framework from the 1994 Sulphur
Protocol II onwards. Article 11(1) provided that ‘[a]ny Party to the Con-
vention may propose an adjustment to annex II to the present Protocol
to add to it its name, together with emission levels, sulphur emission
ceilings and percentage emission reductions’.90 Any such proposal
would need to be adopted by consensus by the parties present at a
session of the EB.91 New parties to the protocols used this provision.
For example, Monaco and Lithuania requested and were granted an
adjustment to Annex II of the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II prior to join-
ing,92 as did Cyprus, who additionally requested an adjustment to
Annex II of the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol,93 along with Macedonia.94
Adjustments had been made to European emission inventories for
POPs and mercury by the EMEP Chemical Coordinating Centre in con-
sultation with national experts in order to meet EMEP requirements
since the early 2000s, but this was for modelling purposes.95
The 2012 Amendments to the Gothenburg Protocol96 contained
an enhanced adjustment process, allowing the application of ‘adjust-
ments to emission reduction commitments, or to inventories for the
purposes of comparing total national emissions with them’, which can
be applied in extraordinary circumstances when ‘such a circumstance
contributes to a Party being unable to meet one of its reduction com-
mitments contained in annex II’.97 The EB decided to bend the rules
for these amendments and provisionally act upon them without the
required instruments of acceptance being received.98 The process is
overseen by the EMEP Centre on Emission Inventories and Projections
(CEIP) in accordance with EB Decisions 2012/3, 2012/4 and 2014/1,
and the EB has to agree on any adjustments.99 There are three
extraordinary circumstances: (i) when the emissions source categories
were not accounted for when the emission reduction commitment
was set; (ii) a significant difference in emission factors for source cat-
egories between when the emission reduction commitments were set
and when they were to be attained;100 and (iii) significant changes in
the methodologies for determining emissions from specific sources
between the time that emission reduction commitments were set and
when they are to be achieved.101
The basic idea with adjustments is given developments in know-
ledge and monitoring, the available information is superior now to
what was known when the Gothenburg Protocol was agreed in 1999.
Therefore, the argument goes, any changes in the reported data
should be adjusted for compliance purposes to focus on what was
known in 1999. Adjustments allow continued State participation and
enable the parties to improve their emissions data free from the threat
of non-compliance. The adjustments process points to the weakness
of the precautionary principle within the regime – governments are
seen responsible only for the obligations agreed with the available
knowledge, and not for any pre-existing uncertainty or scientific pro-
gress leading to the identification of new sources, better emission fac-
tors or better calculation methodologies.102
At the time, this development was not seen as particularly prob-
lematic,103 but the significance of these decisions has increased due
to the actions of the parties. By 2013, the available data suggested
that a number of States would be found in non-compliance with the
2010 emission ceilings/targets under the Gothenburg Protocol,104
amounting to about a third of the parties to the protocol having a
problem with at least one of the pollutants. The States that were
likely to be in non-compliance for NOx were Belgium, Denmark,
France, Luxembourg and Spain; for NMVOCs, Germany and Luxem-
bourg; and for NH3, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway
and Spain.105 The culprits for NOx have been road transport and
88ibid 39.
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agricultural sources (manure, soils and fertilizers); for VOCs it has
been manure management and crops; and for NH3 it has been road
transport, stationary sources, fertilizers and crops.106 There was an
expectation that the Implementation Committee would therefore
have an increased workload. The threat of non-compliance has
resulted in a swathe of applications to adjust the reported data on
national total emissions. Applying for an adjustment suspends any
investigations by the Implementation Committee.
CEIP coordinates the expert technical review of the applications
and from 2014 has received applications from Belgium, Croatia, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.107 These
adjustments have led to a number of countries switching from being
(likely) non-compliant to being in compliance. For example, as a result
of this process, Germany appeared to have achieved its 2010 commit-
ment for NOx, with the adjustment knocking off a staggering 20 per-
cent of reported 2010 emission, whilst it achieved compliance for
NMVOCs by 2014, but may not be in compliance for NH3.
108 Luxem-
bourg appeared to be in compliance after its adjustment for NMVOCs,
but not for NOx.
109 France, after adjustment, appeared to have missed
the 2010 NOx target but achieved compliance by 2013.
110 After the
adjustment of its data, Belgium appeared to be in compliance for both
NOx and NMVOCs.
111 Spain appeared to be in compliance for its
2010 NOx commitment after adjustment.
112 It has not been com-
pletely plain sailing, however: the Croatian submission was not seen as
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant acceptance.113 As a result of
these adjustments, the Implementation Committee closed its investi-
gations into Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Spain.114
From a legal effectiveness approach which prioritizes compliance,
the adjustment process and the subsequent shift to compliance is an
indicator of success. It would not be helpful to the parties or the
regime if the impression was given that compliance was being
achieved through obscure technocratic adjustments. Because the
technical assessment is overseen by experienced experts in emission
inventories, the process has credibility. Having said this, the CEIP
struggled with the initial workload and the adjustment procedure
appears to have had a wider impact on the regime. The procedure did
not come with its own funding source; consequently, limited EMEP
resources were spent on reviewing the applications, and this con-
tributed to the CEIP being unable to complete all its tasks in the
2014–2015 work plan for the implementation of the Convention.115
The fundamental problem is that the sectoral data for emissions is not
the evidence of monitoring for every single source or installation, as
this is not possible, but will only ever be the best available data at a
given time derived from supposedly representative sampling.116
Reviewing the inventory sectors is therefore a time-consuming affair
and a continuous process to improve emission data quality.
Through the adjustment procedure technical data and scientific
knowledge have an enhanced role in determining whether a State is
compliant. A broader interpretation that focuses on the manner in
which a State achieves compliance would consider the balance
between actual emissions reductions (and environmental integrity,
therefore) with the need for historic fairness on the issue of changes in
knowledge. Indeed, the Implementation Committee Chair ‘expressed
the Committee’s appreciation for the decision by one Party to not sub-
mit an application for the use of the inventory adjustment procedure
and to concentrate instead on actual emission reduction measures’.117
The 2016 NEC Directive incorporated the adjustment procedure
into EU law, and nongovernmental organizations and activists have
responded critically. A joint policy position paper by ClientEarth, the
European Environmental Bureau and AirClim, argued that the adjust-
ment procedure ‘is likely to result in higher absolute emissions com-
pared to what is expected at the time the Directive is adopted’.118
They later reiterated the weakness of the adjustment procedure stat-
ing that ‘[i]nstead of pushing Member States to take immediate action
to compensate for possible unforeseen emissions from one sector, the
new rules are likely to leave any increased emissions and associated
health and environmental impacts unaddressed’.119 The same argu-
ments hold for the adjustments under the Gothenburg Protocol.
Adjusting the inventories is a compromise to ensure continuing
progress is made in air pollution reductions. Now that the low-hang-
ing fruits of technical fixes and end-of-tailpipe solutions have been
exploited,120 air pollution policy is under significant pressure to come
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up with cost-effective solutions over the next decade that appeal to
governments in a time of budget austerity. It is unsurprising perhaps
that during this challenging period, States have given themselves an
easy technical fix for what is a substantial and difficult problem. For
environmental lawyers, the results are frustratingly ambiguous and
add to the complexity of assessing effectiveness in this area.
6 | CONCLUSION
The CLRTAP is a useful legal and institutional framework for the
reduction of air pollution, and in light of the UK decision to leave
the EU, it may play an enhanced role in the future. In exploring three
areas of concern (entry into force, State participation and compli-
ance), I have argued that effectiveness assessments should take a
more nuanced approach, and suggested ways in which this might be
achieved. The successful negotiation of the amendments to the late
1990s protocols was a high point in recent times, and over the next
few years it will become clear whether States are committed to
continuing their cooperation under this framework. A clear sign for
this will be if the remaining Western economies and at least some of
the EECCA countries become parties to the late 1990s protocols,
and the parties also accept the amendments that were adopted
between 2009 and 2012.
There appear to be signals that the public are becoming re-engaged
with the air pollution problem, specifically around the issue of children’s
health,121 and this may lead to reinvigorated national debates over air
pollution and transboundary air pollution. If the CLRTAP regime
remains fixed in the 1990s, beyond stabilizing pollution, it will have little
to offer the diverse populations of the UNECE bloc. Further efforts are
required to extend the framework into the Eastern UNECE region, and
this can be aided by clear signals from the West that tackling air pollu-
tion and transboundary air pollution remains a priority and is achievable,
despite difficult economic and political times.
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